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Abstract
Two public-key 0–1 knapsack cryptosystems are proposed, that have so high a density and use
so weak a modular multiplication as a trapdoor, that known attacks can be avoided. Decryption
is fairly slow and may produce more than one decipherment, but all alternative decipherments
can be found. Disambiguating protocols are needed to determine the correct decipherment. It
is suggested to use also redundancy for this purpose. In the 2rst system, the initial knapsack
is constructed from the powers of two, which are multiplied by a constant and reduced with
respect to a modulus to a speci2c range, thus producing the “easy” knapsack. Then weak modular
multiplication is used as a trapdoor transformation with respect to another modulus, which is
typically smaller than some or all of the elements of the easy knapsack. The second knapsack
is constructed iteratively from modularly injective or nearly injective components. Decryption
of small components is based on look-up tables. The speci2c form of the proposal uses also
one large non-injective component, which is generated and decrypted in a way that resembles
superincrease. c© 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Knapsacks reintroduced
1.1. Overview
A great variety of public-key knapsack cryptosystems have been proposed, but the
topic seems to be out of fashion now, because even the most resistant one, the Chor–
Rivest knapsack system [5], was broken in [17].
The purpose of this paper is to suggest that perhaps the knapsack cryptosystems need
not be abandoned if we give up complete uniqueness and the great ease of decryption.
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In the systems that we propose, decryption becomes indeed a lot more complicated
than in earlier knapsack cryptosystems, but is still “easy”, and complete in the sense
that all alternative decipherments can be found. Separate disambiguating procedures
are needed to distinguish between the alternatives, even if there is, most often, only
one.
The search for more secure knapsack cryptosystems, despite their ine@ciency, is
motivated by the possibility that factoring integers or computing discrete logarithms
turns out to be easy. The latter incidence would revive also the Chor–Rivest knapsack,
because the attack depends on the fact that the knapsack construction had to avoid
di@cult discrete logarithms. In this context, it is interesting to note from [14] that the
strongest general tools against the knapsack problem, the lattice reduction algorithms,
have a connection also with factoring and discrete logarithms.
We propose two types of non-injective trapdoor knapsacks. Several other variations
in this line of controlled non-uniqueness were suggested in [8]. There is plenty of
room for variation within the present systems, too, and future work in 2ne tuning may
achieve improvement in security and e@ciency. In this study we specify the parameters
in such a way that the most obvious speci2c weaknesses can be avoided. Beyond this
we base the security of the systems solely on two general properties that allow us to
thwart the known attacks. These properties are the high density and the largeness of
the elements hidden behind the trapdoor.
In the remainder of this section we review some general concepts of knapsack cryp-
tosystems, including the two security properties. Then we present the idea of non-
injectivity and brieDy consider some ways for disambiguation. The 2rst cryptosystem,
which hides a “binary” knapsack, is presented in Section 2. Its construction is so sim-
ple that a detailed algorithm is given. The system is currently impractical because of
its ine@ciency, but its fairly good uniqueness shows what can be achieved by non-
injective knapsacks. In this way, it also allows comparison with the more e@cient but
less unique second system, the congruential knapsack, which is constructed iteratively
from smaller components. Section 3 presents this system initially in a general form and
then more concretely, omitting however certain details concerning how to construct the
component knapsacks.
Along the way we refer to experiments that were run with Mathematica. There are
three appendices: Appendix A contains an example of a decryption code in Math-
ematica, Appendix B a pseudoimplementation of another decryption algorithm, and
Appendix C has more details on the experiments.
1.2. Knapsacks as cryptosystems
The public key A=(ai)ni=1 is a knapsack, i.e. a vector of distinct positive inte-
gers, whose number n is the size of A. The cleartext, or message, M is a bit vec-
tor of the same size as A, its weight indicating the number of 1-bits. Encryption
occurs by computing the scalar product s=M ·A. This amounts to forming a subset
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sum of the elements of A, and it will be convenient to refer to subsets and their
sums, though dealing with the vectors. If all subsets give a diHerent sum then A is
injective.
To decrypt s the recipient, who created the di7cult (-looking) knapsack A, transforms
s to a sum sb of the corresponding subset of his secret knapsack B, which is easy in
the sense that he can easily decipher the sum sb to get the message M . The possibility
of switching from s to sb is called a trapdoor. Typically, it has been built simply
by modular multiplication: A=wB (modm), where m is an integer larger than the
sum of the elements of B, and w is an integer coprime to m. Such a transformation is
called strong modular multiplication and it ensures one-to-one correspondence between
the subset sums of A and B: sb=w−1s (modm). Our trapdoor will still be modular
multiplication, but we will use a weak modulus: we de2ne the strength of m to be
k =m=max B.
The worst vulnerability in knapsack cryptosystems seems to have been that A has
had its density n= log2 max A so low (below 1) that attacks based on lattice reduction
have been able to 2nd M using only knowledge of A and s: [9, 13, 7, 15, 12].
In some cases the lattice algorithms have been used also to 2nd a trapdoor (not
necessarily the original one), whence A becomes easy for the attacker, too. The trapdoor
of the original knapsack system of Merkle and Hellman [10] was also broken without
lattice reduction, by using the facts that B was super-increasing (i.e.
∑j
i=1bi¡bj+1)
and that the modulus was strong [16]. The lattice-based attacks are however the most
powerful ones against the trapdoors, too.
An essential route for the attacks against the trapdoor has been the strong modular
multiplication. The trapdoor modulus m being very large in contrast to most of the
elements of B has allowed to 2nd good simultaneous (i.e. with the same denominator
¡a1) diophantine (i.e. rational) approximations for vectors like (a2=a1; : : : ; at=a1), with
a fairly small t. Such approximations have been the starting point of the attacks. We
infer from the explicit results in [2] that suitable approximations cannot be found if all
b∈B satisfy b¿m=8.
Based on empirical tests up to size n=58, Schnorr and Euchner conclude in [13] that
the hardest subset sum problems are those where the density is about 1 + (log n=2)=n.
This density is so high that there are usually several decipherments of a subset sum,
especially if the sum is of average magnitude. We carried out experiments with the
trapdoor knapsack of Section 3 and found that almost all subset sums with weight
n=2 had several alternative decipherments with weights near n=2. This would allow the
system to be used for signatures.
If our trapdoor knapsacks are made as dense as the Schnorr–Euchner density, they
become too slow to decipher. None of the references mentions a successful attack
against a subset sum problem with n¿100, density ¿1, and message weight near n=2.
The granularity of the data given in [13] does not exclude the possibility for densities
between 1 and the Schnorr–Euchner density to cause similar di@culties for the lattice
approach. A natural candidate for a useful density is at the boundary between injective
and non-injective knapsacks.
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An apparently good, though not strict, upper bound for the largest element of
the densest injective knapsack with n elements is given by un of the Conway–Guy
sequence:
u0 = 0; u1 = 1 and un+1 =2un − un−〈√2n〉;
where 〈::〉 gives the nearest integer [1]. Hence a lower bound for the density of the
densest injective knapsack is n= log2 un. We call this the Conway–Guy density. From
[6] we obtain
0:235125 : : :¡un=2n¡1=4 for n¿23 (1)
and the lower bound is the limit as n grows. For example, u200 is already 0:235129×
2200.
The diHerence between the two named densities is such that when three elements
are removed from a knapsack of size 86 having the Schnorr–Euchner density, the
resulting knapsack has approximately the Conway–Guy density. A similar balance for
four elements occurs at 161.
We will now specify our two axioms for security. The 2rst is a density close to
the Conway–Guy density. The second is a trapdoor modulus m that is small enough
to imply that b¿m=4 for all elements b of the easy knapsack.
The knapsack size is naturally another essential factor in security. It seems that it
is like the key size in any other cryptosystem: as technology evolves, larger sizes not
only become required but also become feasible. We propose the size n=120. Although
we cannot compete, in terms of speed, with any of the currently used public key
cryptosystems, the motivation remains that cryptanalytic techniques may also revolve.
Two overviews of the cryptanalysis of knapsack cryptosystems are [4, 11], and [3] also
contains an account of knapsacks.
1.3. Disambiguation
Adding redundancy and using additional protocols are the two basic ways to disam-
biguate a non-injective cryptosystem. In our case, redundancy will not resolve every
ambiguity. Hence preparedness to communicate some further messages will be needed
to distinguish the correct decipherment among several alternatives. An implementation
will need to address the tradeoH between the amount of redundant bits and the pro-
portion of messages they leave ambiguous. Too much redundancy should obviously be
avoided for security reasons.
The most apparent method of redundancy is to restrict the message weight in some
way, or send it together with the encrypted message. For example, the Chor–Rivest
knapsack [5] is not injective, but decryption is unique if the message weight is 2xed
and below a certain limit, typically less than 18 of the knapsack size, e.g. 24 addends
out of 197 (we called this 24-2x-injectivity in [8]). See [5] for an algorithm to expand
a block of  log ( nn=2
) bits to n bits with n=2 1’s.
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For our systems, we suggest the use of restricted message weights mainly in order
to speed up decryption. In experiments with the system of Section 2 we used the
2xed weight n=2 and obtained such a low failure rate that no other redundancy seems
necessary.
It seems reasonable to introduce a couple of checkbits computed from the rest of
the message to the system of Section 3. In our experiments each additional checkbit
nearly halved the proportion of messages that could not be deciphered uniquely. In a
setting with checkbits, if a 2xed message weight is used, then the checkbit part needs
to be longer, or a part with random bits is needed to adjust the message weight.
A straightforward disambiguating procedure (as or within a protocol) is simply to re-
quest a completely new message from the sender, when decryption has not been unique.
This is manageable, because the contents of the message in public key cryptography
is most often random, like session keys for symmetric cryptosystems or nonces that
assure freshness of a message. Instead of making the request immediately, it is con-
ceivable that in some of these contexts one decipherment may just be taken into use
and disambiguation be launched only when that decipherment turns out to be wrong.
Another possibility is that the recipient, having found several alternatives and know-
ing what would distinguish them, communicates just this information to the sender.
This would of course require a secure protocol, but it could be readily based on using
the message as a key to a symmetric cryptosystem. For example, having obtained a
request to disambiguate, the sender uses the original message as a key to encrypt a
meaningful new message (e.g. including the sender’s name among random bits). The
recipient then tries decryption with all the alternatives and accepts the (only) one that
gives something meaningful. Of course, as one form of redundancy, the sender may
already in the 2rst place accompany the subset sum with such an additional message.
2. The trapdoor binary knapsack
This section presents the construction and decryption of our 2rst knapsack. We derive
an estimate of the decryption complexity, but what we say about the degree of non-
injectivity is drawn from our experiments. In summary, the average decryption time
was nearly 1.5 min for 120-bit messages with weight 60 and the average number of
decipherments for each message was 1.06, with 94.3% of the messages producing a
unique decipherment.
2.1. Construction
This is the algorithm to construct a trapdoor binary knapsack. Our suggestions
concerning the choices of parameters in steps 1 and 2 are given in brackets.
(1) Based on security requirements choose the primary parameters of the public key:
– the size n [n=120]
– the trapdoor modulus m [randomly un¡m¡(1+1=(8n))un]
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(2) Choose secondary parameters:
– the “randomness” factor r, an integer ¿1 [r= n]
– the “squeeze” factor q [randomly 0:75r¡q¡1:25r]
– private knapsack modulus mq= m=q; increment an even mq by 1,
– large multiplier wq (¡mq) coprime to mq,
– large trapdoor multiplier w (¡m) coprime to m,
– a bound ‘, an integer ¿q=2, for the private knapsack.
[‘= 	max(q=2; q− r=2)
]
(3) Compute the “easy” or private knapsack
B=(wq2i−1 (modmq) + eimq)ni=1;
where each ei is chosen randomly from the range ‘6ei6‘ + r − 1.
(4) Compute A′=wB (modm) and let d=min A′.
Compute A=A′ − (d; : : : ; d), sort it in increasing order and use the result as a
public key.
The secret key will consist of the knapsack B, the integers wq, mq, w, m and d, and
the permutation involved in the sorting process.
The size n and trapdoor modulus m were already considered earlier. These will
have the primary eHect on security, complexity of decryption and the degree of non-
injectivity. The parameters r and q will also have an eHect on security though in a
less obvious way; r has a great eHect on complexity, and neither parameter seems to
have a great eHect on non-injectivity.
The ranges for m and mq (via the range of q) are suggested to be large enough
to give them su@cient variability, for security reasons, and on the other hand, narrow
enough to give some predictability of the performance. Choosing m from a range
slightly above un is not contradictory to the aim that max A ≈ un. Both the modular
reduction (modm) and the 2nal subtraction work in the opposite direction.
The meaning of the randomness factor r is that every knapsack element will have a
random choice of r “slots” in step 3. We suggest that r= n just to give every element
a chance to have its own slot.
Since 2n is a strong modulus for (1; 2; 4; : : : ; 2n−1), the “easy” knapsack B would
be injective modulo mq, if mq¿2n. Now the the squeeze factor q makes mq a lot
smaller than this. We suggest that 0:75r¡q¡1:25r in order to allow r to expand this
“squeezed” nature of B to a range of length near m (±m=4). Since usually m¡2n−2,
this is not su@cient to make B even nearly injective modulo mq. The choice of q does
not seem to have a great eHect on the degree of the overall non-injectivity, and we
prefer to keep also B (modularly) non-injective.
By the requirement ‘¿q=2 we ensure that all the elements of B are at least m=2.
It is not clear whether ‘ has any other eHect on the security. It does not aHect the
complexity and seems not to aHect the degree of non-injectivity. We suggest to choose
also ‘¿q− r=2 because then there will be at least as much of B above m as there is
below it, also in the case q¿r.
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The complexity of decryption will be made more feasible by assuming that the
message weight is given together with the encrypted message. This enables the usage
of subtraction in step 4. This makes the 2rst element of A to be 0 and hence extends
our de2nition a little.
2.2. Decryption
We ignore here the obvious treatment of the permutation and imagine that A is the
public key. Given integers s and g the task of decipherment is to 2nd all vectors M
such that M ·A= s and the weight of M is g. Assume that we have precomputed the
values sg and Sg which are, respectively, the sum of the g smallest and largest elements
of B. Actually, these are (for all g’s that are allowed to occur) the only data we need
of B.
Decrypt(s)
Compute sb=w−1(s+ gd) (modm).
Initialize the list L to be empty.
For each t= 	(sg − sb)=m
; : : : ; (Sg − sb)=m do
Let sc =w−1q (sb + tm) (modmq).
For each u=0; 1; : : : ; (2n − sc)=mq do
Let M be the n-bit binary representation of
sc + umq in reverse order.
If the weight of M is g and M ·A= s,
append M to the list L.
Output L.
Correctness of the algorithm. At any stage the list L clearly is a subset of the correct
solutions. Assume M is a message with weight g such that M ·A= s. We will show
that M will appear in L.
Since A=wB (modm), we have s≡w(M ·B) (modm), whence w−1s≡M ·B (modm).
Denoting sb=w−1s (modm), we have that sb + tm=M ·B, for some t. Since sg6M ·B
6Sg, we have (sg − sb)=m6t6(Sg − sb)=m. These are the values that the outer loop
goes through. The smallest value cannot be negative, because sb¡m.
Denote C =(1; 2; 4; : : : ; 2n−1) and assume that t is such that sb+tm=M ·B. Since B ≡
wqC (modmq) we have sb + tm=wq(M ·C) (modwq). Again, denoting sc =w−1q (sb +
tm) (modmq), we have sc + umq=M ·C for some u. Since 06M ·C62n we have
06u6(2n − sc)=mq. These are the values that the inner loop goes through. Actually
2g − 16M ·C62n − 2n−g, but the diHerence is negligible, since g is near n=2.
By now we have seen that in the inner loop sc + umq will once have the value
M ·C, which means that the reverse of M is the binary representation of sc + umq. As
a consequence M will be appended to L.
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Complexity. We evaluate the complexity of the algorithm under the assumption that
m ≈ un. The outer loop executes about (Sg− sg)=m times. The elements of B, resulting
from a modular multiplication, are approximately evenly dispersed between ‘mq and
(‘+ r)mq. This gives Sg− sg ≈ g(1−g=n)rmq. Hence there will be about g(1−g=n)r=q
executions of the outer loop.
For each round of the outer loop the inner loop executes about 2n=mq times. Using (1)
for the Conway–Guy sequence and mq ≈ un=q we get 4q¡2n=mq¡4:26q. Altogether
there are about 4:3g(1 − g=n)r executions of the statements in the inner loop. This
obtains its maximum ≈1:08nr, when g= n=2. Since r is suggested to be equal to n,
we will have 1:08n2 rounds of the inner loop, where the most eHort is required by the
product umq and the scalar product M ·A. Both are with (nearly) n-bit numbers and
hence they both involve bit operations of the order of n2. As a result we see that the
complexity of the algorithm is O(n4).
We may simplify the algorithm (though not its complexity degree) by replacing all
but the 2rst modular reduction of the outer loop by one addition and one subtraction.
At the same time multiplications tm and umq will be replaced by additions. Appendix A
contains a Mathematica program that implements these ideas. The experiments show
that for only about 6% of the inner rounds we need to compute the sum M ·A.
3. The trapdoor congruential knapsack
The general structure of a trapdoor congruential knapsack given in Sections 3.1,
and 3.2 shows how such a knapsack can be deciphered. In Section 3.3 we deal with
decryption complexity, density and non-uniqueness. The concrete proposal appears in
Section 3.4. It gives an average decryption time of 4:1 for 120-bit messages with weight
60 ± 6. The average number of decipherments for each message is 1:5, with 62% of
the messages producing a unique decipherment.
3.1. General construction principles
First, an easily decipherable knapsack, the congruential knapsack B, is put together
iteratively from several components. Each component will be used in decipherment in
its turn separately. All but the 2rst (the innermost) component operate with respect
to a modulus. As the decipherment proceeds (or actually retreats) iteratively through
the components it is divided into branches. This means that a component may give
several integers as input to the next component. It is not necessary for the construction,
but we assume that an integer never has more than two modular decipherments w.r.t.
a component. A modularly non-injective component will then produce for each input
a number of decipherments that on average is between 1 and 2. There may be also
modularly injective components, which cut oH some branches.
Second, the easy knapsack B is transformed to the supposedly di@cult knapsack A,
by modular multiplication by a w with respect to a weak modulus m. Hence the
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trapdoor congruential knapsack is A=wB (modm). Before using it as a public key,
its elements must of course be permuted, but we will ignore this in the sequel.
We will next concentrate on the “easy” knapsack B, the congruential knapsack.
Using ∪ to denote joining of vectors, we get
B=mr(mr−1(: : : m2(m1B0 ∪B′1)∪B′2 : : : )∪B′r−1)∪B′r
=m1 · · ·mrB0 ∪m2 · · ·mrB′1 ∪ : : : ∪mrB′r−1 ∪B′r :
The 2rst component B0 is called the initial knapsack. The B′1; : : : ; B
′
r are the modular
components, whose moduli are the integers m1; : : : ; mr . Denote ni = |B′i | and n=
∑r
i=0 ni.
For i=1; : : : ; r we have 2ni−16mi¡2ni+1. The lower bound comes from the restric-
tion to always give at most two modular decipherments. The upper bound is natural,
because a larger mi could already “house” a modularly injective knapsack of size ni+1.
The design of a modular component B′i is based on a Bi, which equals B
′
i (modmi):
The B′i is in:ated from Bi by adding to its elements multiples of mi. If ni is small
this can be done in such a way that the inDated B′i is injective, even if it were not so
modulo mi.
The initial knapsack B0 is to be dense, injective and small enough for complete
enumeration of its subset sums. Decipherment can thus be carried out by table lookup.
This would not be essential, if there were other ways to make B0 extremely dense.
Its density, however, will be an important ingredient in the high density of B. On the
other hand, its injectivity helps in pruning some branches of the decipherments.
Each knapsack Bi; i=1; : : : ; r, is either su@ciently small for construction of a de-
cipherment table, or based on superincrease (injective case, not used here) or near
super-increase (non-injective case), and in such cases it is 2rst transformed by a mod-
ular multiplication w.r.t. mi. What we mean by near super-increase will be explained
next.
3.1.1. A knapsack covering its sum
Consider a knapsack A=(ai)ni=1 and assume it is in increasing order. Denote sk =∑k
i=1 ai; 06k6n. We will 2rst present a generalization of super-increasing decryption.
The following observation actually gives a general algorithm for 2nding all decipher-
ments M =(M1; : : : ; Mn) of a subset sum s′ of (ai)ni=1.
Assume 16k6n and that Mi is known for i= n; n − 1; : : : ; k + 1. Assume that we
are given a subset sum s of (ai)ki=1. Initially s= s
′ and nothing is known of M . Note
that (ai)0i=1 means an empty vector whose only subset sum is 0. Choose only the 2rst
case that matches:
• s¡ak : Mk =0 and s is a subset sum of (ai)k−1i=1 .
• ak6s6sk−1: split M into two copies:
1. Mk =1 and s− ak is a subset sum of (ai)k−1i=1
2. Mk =0; Mk−1 = 1 and s− ak−1 is a subset sum of (ai)k−2i=1 .
• s¿sk−1: Mk =1 and s− ak is a subset sum of (ai)k−1i=1 .
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This will be the procedure for decrypting the knapsack behind the large modular com-
ponents (i.e. behind an inverse multiplication modulo sn + 1). Appendix B shows a
pseudocode for implementing this when we know in advance that at most one splitting
is needed. This will be the case with the large components, because we will construct
them in the way implied by the following theorem. Its proof is straightforward and
will not be given here.
Theorem 1. Let 36p6n. Assume that the task is to construct a vector A=(ai)ni=1;
in such a way that (a1; : : : ; ap−1)= (1; 2; : : : ; 2p−2); ap¡2p−1; the subset sums of A
obtain all values from the range 0; : : : ; sn; and no subset sum of A has more than 2
decipherments. In such a setting
(i) The value of ap can be chosen freely from the range 2p−2¡ap¡2p−1.
(ii) The subset sums 6ap − 1 have exactly one decipherment.
(iii) The sum sn satis;es 2n−1 + ap − 16sn62n−1 − 1 + ap2n−p.
(iv) Any choice of the remaining values ak ; k =p+1; : : : ; n; satisfying sk−1−ap¡ak6
sk−1 + 1 is possible; but no others.
(v) Every value of sn between the bounds in (iii) can be obtained by a suitable
choice according to (iv).
(vi) The smallest possible sum is 2n−1 + 2p−2 and the largest one is 2n − 2n−p − 1.
We call the knapsack A covering, if its subset sums obtain all values from the
range 0; : : : ; sn. More speci2cally, we say that it covers sn. It requires only some more
elaboration in order to use the theorem to construct knapsacks that cover a given
integer in a randomized way. In any case when i¿10 we have ai ≈ c2i−1, where c
is a constant, 1¡c¡2. With similar but more “compressive” methods it is of course
possible to get rid of one ratio to the powers of 2, while retaining some restricted
number of decipherments. We do not consider these methods here.
3.2. Decryption
Assume that the sub-algorithm DecryptB returns all decipherments according to the
underlying congruential knapsack B. Denote by sB the sum of all elements of B. The
trapdoor of A can be opened by the following algorithm.
DecryptA(sa)
Compute s=w−1sa (modm).
Initialize the list L to be empty.
For each t=0; : : : ; (sB − s)=m do
Let D= DecryptB(s+ tm).
For each decipherment M in the list D do
If the weight of M is appropriate and M ·A= sa,
append M to the list L.
Output L.
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DecryptB works iteratively through stages i= r; r−1; : : : ; 1; 0, to 2nd all the possible
decipherments of a given integer s w.r.t. B. The result of each stage i is a list Ti of
partial decipherments consisting of vi pairs of the form (st ; t). Here t is a bit vector of
length
∑r
h=i nh representing a decipherment according to the components with indices
i; : : : ; r. What remains from s to be input to the next stage is given in st .
We denote catenation by ‖ and the empty sequence by #. To simplify the algorithm
we have assumed that m0 = 1 and the “(mod 1)” is ignored on the line (∗). Note that
the vi is needed only for evaluation of the algorithm.
DecryptB(s)
Let Tr+1 = {(sr+1;1; tr+1;1)}, where sr+1;1 = s and tr+1;1 = #.
Let vr+1 =1.
For i= r; r−1; : : : ; 1; 0 do
Let Ti = {}; vi =0
For each (si+1; j ; ti+1; j)∈Ti+1 do
Find all decipherments of si+1; j (modmi) w.r.t. Bi: (∗)
For each such decipherment t do
increment vi by 1 and
append to Ti the pair ((si+1; j − t · B′i)=mi; t ‖ ti+1; j); (†)
but only if the subtraction does not give a negative value.
Output the list of the second items (the t’s) from the pairs of the list T0.
Correctness of the algorithm. As we have dealt with the trapdoor transformation al-
ready, it su@ces to concentrate on DecryptB. Since the decipherment is eventually
checked against A, it su@ces to show that no decipherment w.r.t. B is missed.
Assume x and y are consecutive indices (16x + 1=y6r) and consider a subset
sum s of the knapsack Bˆy =myBˆx ∪By having a decipherment d. Break d in two parts
d=dx‖dy, where |dx|= |Bˆx| and |dy|= |By|. Then dx · (myBy) + dy · By = s and hence
dy · By ≡ s (modmy), and (s − dy · By)=my =dx · Bˆx. We see that in the round i=y
of the algorithm the line (∗) will produce the required dy, and line (†) will store the
correct remnant of s in order to extract dx during the remaining rounds. It is obvious
that negative numbers need not be stored. It is also clear that the last round properly
treats B0.
3.3. Interplay of complexity, non-injectivity and density
Security is the fourth entity that is aHected in this game. Hence, we begin with 2xing
a couple of choices that are motivated by security reasons.
First, we set the density requirement for B0 to be max B060:33 · 2n0 . Smaller values
for max B0 can be obtained, but we suggest that B0 is not forced to be very near the
density limit (which is e.g. max B0 = 309 ≈ 0:302 · 210 for n0 = 10). This allows us
to have a reasonably large choice of diHerent B0’s, which is a protection against the
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possible guessing attacks, that try to exploit the fact that the elements of B0 do not
get inDated and they are also accompanied by the largest multiplier in B. Currently,
we have nearly 2000 knapsacks of size 10 eligible for B0.
Second, to get min B su@ciently large in contrast to the trapdoor modulus m we
will do the following: we choose such a B0 that h=min B0=max B0¿0:4. This is a
natural choice because a dense initial knapsack B0 most often has h between 0.4 and
0.5. Next, we will always carry out the inDation in such a way that the result goes
between m1 · · ·mr min B0 and m1 · · ·mr max B0. Finally, we choose m¡1:4max B. This
will result in min B¿0:28m.
3.3.1. Complexity
Assume that the n elements of B are approximately evenly dispersed between hmax B
and max B, and the modulus m is of strength k. Then the sum sa will produce about
(h+ 1)n=(2k) diHerent calls to DecryptB from DecryptA.
Each stage i of DecryptB launches vi+1 processes of decryption w.r.t. a component
Bi and altogether produces and manipulates vi partial decipherments. Assume 2rst that
Bi is a large component. Then each decryption 2rst involves a modular multiplication
w.r.t. mi, which can be combined with the reduction shown on the line (∗). The com-
plexity is O(log2 mi) bit operations. Then follows a process of decrypting a covering
knapsack with at most two decipherments. It consists of element-wise subtractions, an
eHort proportional to ni times the size of the numbers in bits, which is less than logmi.
All these eHorts are required vi+1 times. After them there will most notably be vi di-
visions by mi, which are again O(log
2 mi) operations. Since ni is within logmi ± 1,
we conclude that the ith stage with a large component requires an eHort proportional
to (vi+1 + vi)n2i . This formula is valid also for the small components. They only need
a fast table look-up for decryption but the numerical operations still have the corre-
sponding complexity. The last stage (with i=0) is simpler, but ignoring this does not
aHect the estimate signi2cantly.




i : In practice h is at most
0.5, and k is bound to be near 1. For the Conway–Guy density, the vi’s will remain
bounded (as we will see below). Hence the complexity is on the order of n3. This is
the case for example in our concrete knapsack where nr is only slightly smaller than n.
If all the components are small, then the complexity is O(n2).
3.3.2. Density
The modular part of B is of size n− n0 =
∑r
i=1 ni and it “operates” with respect to
m1 · · ·mr , being more or less non-injective modulo this number. Denote u=
∑r
i=1 ni−




Since max A is slightly smaller than m, and m= k max B, we have that the den-
sity of A is near above n= log k max B= n= log(km1 · · ·mr max B0). Plugging into this
the restrictions k¡1:4 and max B060:33 · 2n0 , and applying the formula for u, we
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obtain n=(n− 1:11− u) as an estimate for the density of A. For sizes 120 and 200 this
will give the Conway–Guy densities 1.02579 and 1.01055, when u is approximately
1.91 and 0.978 respectively. In general, the larger the size, the smaller u su@ces. Using
the asymptotics of the Conway–Guy density from (1), we get u ≈ 0:974445.
Due to the restriction made on the mi’s (in Section 3.1) we have 12¡2
ni = logmi62
and hence −r¡u6r. Having computed u from the density requirement this gives
us the minimal number of modular components. We next see that 2u is a somewhat
pessimistic measure for the non-injectivity of the modular part.
3.3.3. Non-injectivity
We 2rst derive a theoretical estimate for v1, which is the number of decipherments
produced by the modular part of B.
In principle vi tends to be smaller or larger than vi+1 depending on whether Bi is
modularly injective or not. Decipherment according to Bi (16i6r) is a relation from
the modular range 0; : : : ; mi − 1 to all of the 2ni diHerent decipherments. An arbitrary
integer will thus have on average 2ni =mi modular decipherments. For subset sums a non-
injective Bi would however give on average slightly more decipherments, unless we
make the special requirement that each Bi (i¿0) be as injective as possible modulo mi.
This means that if mi¿2ni , then Bi must be injective modulo mi, and if mi¡2ni then
Bi must have mi distinct subset sums modulo mi.
We deduce that vi =(2ni =mi)vi+1, for 16i6r, whence v1 =
∏r
i=1(2
ni =mi)= 2u. We
said above that to reach the Conway–Guy density for A it su@ces to have x ≈ 1:91,
when n=120. This would give us v1 ≈ 3:76. This is an overestimate, because some
subtractions from the intermediate sums will lead to below zero when the stage is
already near 1.
The initial knapsack is injective and hence v06v1. Actually, the initial knapsack will
usually cut oH a good proportion of the branches, because being non-modular it has
also an upper limit of its sum range, within which it typically obtains fewer than half
of the values as subset sums (which would mean v06v1=2).
In an experiment with the system of Section 3.4 we had v0 ≈ 0:4v1 and v1 was
about half of the predicted magnitude. Also v2 was smaller than predicted. Only v3
was as predicted, which is natural because it represented the outermost component
(r=3). Roughly 80% of the calls to DecryptB from DecryptA did not produce any
decipherments. These results show that a theoretical analysis of non-injectivity may
have only limited value. For example, we cannot leave out any call to DecryptB without
potentially missing some decipherments, as seen by producing suitable “pathological”
messages.
This di@culty of theoretical analysis is further exempli2ed in the 2nal checks against
the knapsack A in DecryptA. Roughly 90% of these failed in the test, giving us alto-
gether an average of only 1.5 decipherments for each message.
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3.4. A concrete congruential trapdoor knapsack
Motivation for some major choices for the the generation algorithm was given earlier.
Before presenting the algorithm, we introduce a couple of other choices. Some further
explanations are given after the algorithm.
What makes B special among knapsacks is that many of the elements have large
common factors and furthermore these factors are products of fairly small numbers. It
is not clear how a luckily guessed large factor could be exploited through the trapdoor,
which includes also the permutation. However, it seems worth making the guess even
more di@cult. To this end, we 2rst choose only distinct primes as the moduli of the
small components. Secondly, we reduce the number of the small moduli by introducing
large components also, whose moduli do not have small factors.
We achieve the Conway–Guy density conveniently by using just one large non-
injective component on top of two small modular components and the initial knapsack.
We choose the two small moduli to be at least 29 in order to provide a good variety
for the random inDation of the large component. Finding maximally injective modular
components is not a fast process and hence we suggest that they be either precomputed
for private use or retrieved from common databases. In the latter case, their variety
can be maximized by multiplying a retrieved knapsack Bj modulo mj before using it
in the construction.
3.4.1. Generation algorithm
This algorithm creates a dense trapdoor knapsack based on the congruential con-
struction and using one large non-injective covering knapsack. Besides the initial in-
jective knapsack there will be two small modular components with moduli in the range
521–8191. The number (q) of these components can be made larger without aHecting
the algorithm (provided, of course, that q is not so large as not to leave space also for
the covering component).
(1) Primary parameters of the public knapsack. Based on security requirements choose
the size n, the trapdoor modulus m and its strength k. We propose the following:
(i) n ≈ 120,
(ii) choose m randomly from a su@ciently large range near un of the Conway–
Guy sequence, e.g. un¡m¡un (1 + 1=(8n)).
(iii) choose k randomly: 1¡k¡1:4.
(2) The initial knapsack B0.
(i) Choose the size n0 ≈ 10 and the density parameter & ≈ 0:33 of the initial
knapsack.
(ii) Find by random search (or from a precomputed collection) an injective knap-
sack B0, with size n0 such that max B06&2n0 and min B0¿0:4max B0.
(3) Moduli and sizes of the modular components.
(i) Denote x= n− n0 + log(k max B0=m).
(ii) Let q=2. This will be the number of small modular components.
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(v) Let t= x + y − 0:05. If t6x + y − 0:99 go back to (iii).
(vi) Let ni = logmi, 16i6q. Choose randomly t of the indices i and increment
the corresponding ni’s by 1.
(vii) Let nr = n−
∑q
i=0 ni.
(viii) Let mr be such an integer very close to m=(k max B0
∏q
i=1 mi) that it has no
factors below 213.
(4) The small components B′i . For each i=1; : : : ; q do the following.
(i) Choose a knapsack Bi of size ni such that it has min(mi; 2ni) diHerent
subset sums modulo mi (i.e. Bi is to be injective modulo mi if ni was not
incremented in 3(vi)).
(ii) If Bi is taken from a common database, perform a modular multiplication:
Bi := cBi (modmi) for some integer 1¡c¡m.
(iii) Construct the knapsack B′i from Bi by inDation: Start with B
′
i =(). For each
element b of Bi: choose randomly an integer e such that m1 · · ·mi−1 min B0¡e¡
m1 · · ·mi−1 max B0 and append b+emi to B′i , but only if B′i remains injective.
Otherwise choose another value for e until this happens.
(5) The covering component B′r .
(i) Create a knapsack C =(ci)
nr
i=1 that covers mr − 1, and whose subset sums
have at most 2 decipherments.
(ii) Choose randomly a large wr coprime to mr .
(iii) For each i=1; : : : ; nr: choose randomly an ei from the range m1 · · ·mqmin B0¡
ei¡m1 · · ·mqmax B0 and let b′i =(wrci (modmr)) + eimr ,





(6) The complete knapsacks B and A.
(i) Compute the easy knapsack
B=m1 · · ·mqmrB0 ∪
q⋃
i=1
mi+1 · · ·mqmrB′i ∪B′r :
(ii) Choose a large integer w coprime to m. Compute the “di@cult” knapsack
wB(modm), sort it in the increasing order and use the result A=(ai)ni=1 as a
public key. Let the permutation ' involved in the sorting process be such that
ai =wb'(i) (modm).




r and C, integers wr; mr; w
and m and the permutation '.
3.4.2. Notes on the algorithm
The congruential construction is rather apparent and follows the guidelines given
earlier. Especially, by the choice of m the density of A gets very close to the Conway–
Guy density, and the choice of mr in 3(viii) implies that the strength of m is k.
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There are two points in the algorithm, the completion of which depends on random
choices. Step 3(v) requires repetition only if the interval (x + y − 0:99; x + y − 0:05)
does not contain an integer. This will not take many iterations, because the length
of the interval is 0.94, and the random choice of the moduli in step 3(iii) provides
considerable variety for y.
The other point is 4(iii), where injectivity is required of the small modular compo-
nent B′i . When n0¿10, the diHerence max B0−min B0 is more than 100, and this seems
to provide enough variety for the random inDation to almost always lead to injectivity
of already the 2rst modular component: during construction of hundreds of congruential
knapsacks we have met only a couple of cases where a new inDating factor e had to
be chosen for an element of a Bi.
We next explain and justify the auxiliary variables x; y and t. The values of x
and y summarize the choices of several knapsack parameters. The role of t is in a
way to 2nd a suitable “slot” within these choices to allow further choices, especially
that of mr .
The goal of t is twofold. Firstly, t is chosen in step 3(v) to satisfy −0:99¡− x−y+
t¡−0:05. Combining this with the fact that logmr ≈ nr−x−y+t, we have that nr and
mr in steps 3(vii) and (viii) satisfy 2nr−0:99¡mr¡2nr−0:05. From part (vi) of Theorem 1
we see that it is possible in step 5(i) to construct a knapsack of size nr covering
mr − 1 and having at most two decipherments for each subset sum. Furthermore, the
2rst element in this knapsack diHering from a power of 2 can be already the 2fth one
(i.e. p¿5 in the theorem). The bound −0:99 su@ces for this when nr¿12, and the
bound −0:05 is valid for all nr . A more accurate value for it would be −0:0458.
Secondly, t is an integer, and we will next show that it satis2es 06t6q. This
property is needed in 3(vi), where t determines how many of the q small modular
components are non-injective, but with at most two decipherments of each subset sum
(i.e. each ni becomes incremented at most once).
Using m ≈ un and max B0 ≈ &2n0 gives x ≈ log(k2n&=un). Plug into this the following
bounds: 1¡k¡1:4; 0:235¡un=2n¡0:250 (from (1)) and 0:259¡&60:33 (the lower
bound from the Conway–Guy sequence, valid for the densest knapsack until the size
18). The result is that x will vary between 0.3 and 0.98. Now, plug these bounds and
0¡y¡q to x+ y− 0:99¡t¡x+ y− 0:05, which is the result of 3(v) and note that t
is an integer. The outcome is that 06t6q, as required.
4. Conclusion
We have proposed two dense non-injective trapdoor knapsacks, both involving es-
sentially a weak modulus m and a multiplier w as trapdoor. Their performance is very
diHerent. The 2rst system is clearly ine@cient, while decryption of the second one
takes, with size 120, about 10 times longer than an RSA-decryption with 512-bit num-
bers, both using Mathematica software. The degree of non-injectivity is a lot larger in
the second system, and checkbits are suggested as a 2rst aid in resolving ambiguity.
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There is however some similarity between the systems: in some order we may write
all the elements of the trapdoor binary knapsack, and a majority of the elements (the
large component) of the trapdoor congruential knapsack as
ai =w(w∗(i + (ei − ri)m∗)− kim− d;
where (i either equals 2i−1 or is close to it (in proportion). The subtrahend d is an
additional trapdoor for the binary system. In the congruential system d=0, but a non-
zero value could be used, if the message weight is always known. The factors ki are
determined by the modular reduction of the trapdoor multiplication. The ri’s have a
similar role w.r.t. the multiplication by w∗ modulo m∗. The ei’s are random. Similar
randomness, though from slightly more limited ranges, extends also to most of the
elements not covered in the equation (i.e. to the small modular components, for which
w∗=1 and ri =0).
Future work, besides trying to break these systems, will be needed to develop dis-
ambiguation procedures. They may become useful in other contexts as well. Similar
procedures that treat occasional failures will be needed for the possible development
of the proposed systems to be used for signing.
Appendix A. Mathematica code for decryption of the trapdoor binary knapsack.
This is an implementation in Mathematica of the decryption algorithm in the form
suggested at the end of Section 2.2. We assume that we have precomputed the tables
minSum[..] and maxSum[..], where e.g. minSum[g] equals the sum of the g smallest
elements of the knapsack B. Also the following three variables must be precomputed:
x = PowerMod[w, −1, m]; ( ∗ w−1 (modm) ∗ )
xq = PowerMod[wq, −1, mq]; ( ∗ w−1q (modmq) ∗ )
xqm = Mod[ xq ∗m, mq]; ( ∗ w−1q m (modmq) ∗ )
The call will be
decrypt[ s, ( ∗ subset sum to be deciphered ∗ )
g, ( ∗weight of the message ∗ )
A, ( ∗ the public knapsack A, unpermuted ∗ )
n, ( ∗ size of A ∗ )
minSum[g], ( ∗ sg ∗ )
maxSum[g], ( ∗ Sg ∗ )
m, ( ∗ m ∗ )
mq, ( ∗ mq ∗ )
x, xq, xqm ]
and the algorithm is
decrypt[s , g , A , n , sg , Sg , m , mq , x , xq , xqm ] :=
Module[ { sb, sc0, sc, t0, t1, L, M, twon = 2ˆn }, ( ∗ the local variables ∗ )
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sb=Mod[ x∗(s+g∗d), m ]; ( ∗= sb=w−1(s+ gd) (modm) ∗ )
t0=Ceiling[ (sg–sb)=m ]; ( ∗ t0 is the 2rst and t1 the last ∗ )
t1=Floor [ (Sg–sb)=m ]; ( ∗ value for t of the outer loop ∗ )
sc0=Mod[ xq∗(sb+t0∗m), mq ]; ( ∗ = sc =w−1q (sb + t0m) (modmq) ∗ )
L= {}; ( ∗ an empty list ∗ )
For[ t = t0 , t¡=t1 , ++t ,
sc= sc0;
While[ True ,
M=Reverse[ Rest[ IntegerDigits[ twon + sc, 2 ]]];
If[ Count[ M, 1] == g && M . A == s ,
AppendTo[ L, M ]
];
sc= sc + mq; ( ∗ eHect of u in sc + umq ∗ )
If[ sc ¿= twon, Break[ ] ]
];
sc0= sc0 + xqm; ( ∗ eHect of t in w−1q (sb + tm) (modmq) ∗ )
If[ sc0 ¿= mq, ( ∗ both addends were ¡mq; ∗ )




Appendix B. An algorithm for decryption of a covering knapsack when there are at
most 2 decipherments.
This is a pseudocode implementation of the decryption algorithm presented in
Section 3.1. It is assumed that the knapsack (ai)ni=1 has been constructed in accordance
with Theorem 1. This means that every integer 06s6sn has 1 or 2 decipherments.
This will mean that at most one recursive call will be made when the code is run (this
is how M is split in two branches). The 2rst call to decrypt(s; h) must satisfy h= n
and 06s6sn.
Instead of storing every sum sk =
∑k
i=1 ai; 06k6n, we may replace the statement
“if s¿sk−1” by “if s¿ak+dk”, where dk = sk−1+1−ak . The numbers dk are small: by
part (iv) of the theorem 06dk6ap, where ap is the 2rst element in (ai)ni=1 diHering
from a power of two.
The empty sequence is denoted by #, catenation by ‖.
decrypt(s; h)
if h=0 return #
M := #
M2 := #
for k := h to 1
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if s¡ak
M := 0 ‖ M
else if s¿sk−1
M := 1 ‖ M
s := s− ak
else
M2 = decrypt(s− ak−1; k − 2) ‖ 10 ‖M
M := 1 ‖ M
s := s− ak




Appendix C. Experimental results
We ran our experiments on an HP9000=735. For a comparison, Mathematica used
0.56 s on this system to do RSA decryption, i.e. to compute xy(mod z), for 512-bit
numbers.
If not stated otherwise the density of the knapsacks was approximately the Conway–
Guy density of the size in question.
C.1. The binary system
For the trapdoor binary knapsack all our experiments used the message weight n=2.
To experiment with the interplay of the secondary parameters r and q we created 10
knapsacks of size n=40 for each combination of r= n=2; n; 2n and q= n=4; n=2; n; 2n.
We tested each knapsack with 100 random messages. The average percentage of unique
decipherments was 81.4 for r= n=2; q=2n (together with two other 10×100 tests the
average was 81.6). For the remaining 11 combinations the average percentage varied
between 84.0 and 86.0 without any clear connection with either r or q. We conclude
that within the suggested ranges of the parameters r and q there is no signi2cant
diHerence in the degree of non-injectivity.
In these tests the parameter ‘ was as suggested in the algorithm. We made three
similar series of tests also for r= q= n, and ‘=4n; 16n; 64n. The percentages of unique
decipherments were 84.6, 83.4, and 86.3, respectively. It seems that ‘ has very little
eHect on the degree of non-injectivity.
As a real scale experiment we created 10 knapsacks of size 120, by using the
suggestions given in the algorithm: r= q= n; ‘= n=2. Each knapsack was tested with
100 messages. The decipherment was unique in all but 5.7% of the cases. The average
number of decipherments was 1.06, the maximal number being 3. For each message
on average 15584 bit representations were extracted, but about 93.6% of these had a
wrong weight.
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Decipherment took on average 86 s with a standard deviation of 5 s.
C.2. The congruential system
We have been searching for small modular knapsacks by an algorithm that starts from
a random knapsack and repeatedly makes a random choice of an element involved in a
coincidence of two subset sums and then tries new values for this element until there
are fewer coincidences altogether. If this is not possible, another element is chosen
to be changed. Even this may not be possible and so the number of coincidences is
allowed to increase in the hope that such a shake will enable a subsequent decrease.
Basically the same algorithm has been used for the non-modular injective knapsack.
There are several slight variants of the algorithm, none of which is substantially better
than the others. These algorithms were implemented as C programs. If they were to
be used for on-line computations then the component size would be limited only up
to 8. The congruential knapsack uses small components of size 9–13. In our experi-
ments we used precomputed knapsacks. Our collection contains both an injective and
a (minimally) non-injective knapsack for every prime below 213.
In the experiments the initial knapsack B0 was always chosen with max B0 = 337=
0:33×210. This is the least dense B0 according to the generation algorithm and hence
the non-injectivity of the rest of B is at its worst.
The 2rst table presents results concerning 10 knapsacks of size 120, with 100 mes-
sages for each. The messages were otherwise random but there were varying restrictions
on their weight. These are useful to reduce the decipherment eHort caused by weakness
of the trapdoor modulus. On the other hand, such restrictions are reasonable, because
the more the message weight diHers from n=2 the easier the subset sum problem is for
an attacker. The choice of 60± 6 is based simply on the standard deviation (5.48) of
the message weight. The table gives decryption time in seconds and its standard devia-
tion *, the average number of decipherments d and the percentage u of decipherments
that were unique.
Weight Time * d u
60 2.8 0.8 1.51 61.9
60± 6 4.1 1.1 1.48 62.1
60± 12 5.1 1.3 1.47 63.7
For example, the experiments with message weight 60 ± 6 produced the following
distribution:
Number of decipherments 1 2 3 4 5
Proportion, % 62.1 29.7 6.3 1.8 0.1
The following table gives some results from larger knapsacks.
Size Weight Time u
160 80± 7 5.6 67.1 40 knapsacks, 50 messages for each
200 100± 8 7.4 68.3 22 knapsacks, 50 messages for each
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In another experiment with knapsacks of size 120 we included c=1; : : : ; 7 checkbits in
messages in such a way that the resulting message weight was within a speci2c range.
The single checkbit was just an even parity bit. The other amounts of checkbits were
formed in the following way.
Basically, the integer value of the (120 − c)-bit-long message modulo 2c − 1 was
appended to make the message 120 bits long. This would have ignored the checkbit
sequence of c 1-bits. Hence, these checkbits were assigned to an equal share of each of
the residue classes modulo 2c − 1. This happened by accumulating the message value
with the following algorithm that gives a v which is only partly reduced modulo 2c−1.
When v was 0 modulo 2c the 1-bits were appended; otherwise the bits of v modulo
2c − 1.
h := 1 (h represents the binary positional
v :=M1 value of Mi (mod 2c − 1))
For i := 2 to n− c do
h := 2h (mod c2 − 1)
v := v+Mi h
For each knapsack and each checkbit amount we generated and deciphered 200 mes-
sages and recorded the percentage of messages that could not be recovered uniquely.
The following table gives these percentages under three restrictions on weight w, as
averages over N knapsacks. The column with label 0 gives the average percentage of
non-unique decipherments over all numbers of checkbits.
Number of checkbits 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
w=0::120; N =5 34.90 19.10 15.40 7.60 2.70 2.00 0.90 0.40
w=60± 12; N =6 36.26 21.42 13.33 6.00 2.50 1.67 0.92 0.00
w=60± 6; N =10 39.71 23.25 14.55 7.25 3.05 1.65 0.65 0.30
C.3. Signing messages with a knapsack having Schnorr–Euchner density
We created 20 trapdoor conguential knapsacks of size 83 with the Conway–Guy
density. We then augmented each of them with three additional elements that were
computed as the averages of pairs of elements at the following positions in the sorted
original knapsack: 20, 21; 41, 42 and 62, 63.
The augmented knapsack had approximately the Schnorr–Euchner density. For each
augmented knapsack we produced 50 messages with weight 43 and found out all
decryptions other than the message. The average number of these was 4.36. The three
extra elements were treated separately and hence the complexity was 8 times that of
the original knapsack.
There were 36 cases out of the 2000 messages, i.e. 1.8%, where no other decipher-
ment was found. In 16 other cases there was no other decipherment within the weight
43± 5 (standard deviation of the message weight is 4.64).
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If a knapsack with Conway–Guy density is used for encryption, protocols resolving
ambiguity will be used. If also protocols for “resolving unambiguity” can be deviced,
then the corresponding augmented knapsack could be used for signing. For the size
120 obviously four extra elements would be needed.
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